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Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, 2012, №8 (8) Август

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Артикул: 452958.0012.99
Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, 2012, №8 (8) Август-Орел:Редакция журнала RJOAS,2012.-30 с.[Электронный ресурс]. - Текст : электронный. - URL: https://znanium.com/catalog/product/429555 (дата обращения: 02.05.2024). – Режим доступа: по подписке.
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ФЕЕДДЕЕРРААЛЛЬЬННААЯЯ ССЛЛУУЖ
ЖББАА ППО
О ННААДДЗЗО
ОРРУУ ВВ ССФ
ФЕЕРРЕЕ ССВВЯЯЗЗИИ,, ИИННФ
ФО
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МААЦЦИИО
ОННННЫ
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ТТЕЕХХННО
ОЛЛО
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МААССССО
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ОССККО
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РРО
ОССССИИЙЙССККИИЙЙ Ж
ЖУУРРННААЛЛ ССЕЕЛЛЬЬССККО
ОХХО
ОЗЗЯЯЙЙССТТВВЕЕННННЫ
ЫХХ ИИ ССО
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О-
ЭЭККО
ОННО
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МИИЧЧЕЕССККИИХХ ННААУУКК 
 

RUSSIAN-ENGLISH JOURNAL 

RRuussssiiaann JJoouurrnnaall

ooff AAggrriiccuullttuurraall aanndd SSoocciioo--EEccoonnoom
miicc

SScciieenncceess

№
№88((88)),, AAuugguusstt 22001122

ISSN 2226-1184, http://www.rjoas.com 

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ
CONTENT 
 
 
 
Российский журнал

сельскохозяйственных и социальноэкономических наук 

Russian Journal 
of Agricultural and Socio-Economic 
Sciences 
 
выпуск 
8(8) 
issue 
август 2012
August 
 
 
 

М
М..ОО.. ИИззооттоовв 
Особенности экономического подхода при 
исследовании феномена коррупции 

3 
M
M.. IIzzoottoovv 
Features of an economic approach at research 
of corruption phenomenon 
 
 
 

СС.. ННааййээмм 
The rationale behind weakly tied networking 
of the bangladeshi diaspora in Malaysia 

6 
SS.. NNaayyeeeemm 
The rationale behind weakly tied networking 
of the bangladeshi diaspora in Malaysia 
 
 
 

СС.. М
Мууссттааффаа,, ПП.. ББззууггуу,,
ИИ.. ААллии,, АА.. ААббддууллллааххии 
Determinants of adaptation to deforestation 
among farmers in Madagali local government 
area of Adamawa state, Nigeria 

15 
SS..BB.. M
Muussttaapphhaa,, PP..M
M.. BBzzuugguu,,

II..M
M.. AAllii,, AA.. AAbbdduullllaahhii 
Determinants of adaptation to deforestation 
among farmers in Madagali local government 
area of Adamawa state, Nigeria 
 
 
 

ГГ..ДД.. ААкккквваахх 
A threshold cointegration analysis of asymmetric 
adjustments in the Ghanaian maize markets 

21 
HH.. ddee--GGrraafftt AAccqquuaahh 
A threshold cointegration analysis of asymmetric 
adjustments in the ghanaian maize markets 
 
 
 

ЛЛ..АА.. Ш
Шииллоовваа 
Социально-экономическое развитие 
Центрального федерального округа 
Российской Федерации с учетом 
методологических аспектов инновационного 
управления отходами 

26 
LL.. SShhiilloovvaa 
Socio-economic development of the Central 
federal district of Russian Federation with 
methodological aspects of innovation waste 
management 

 

M.O. IZOTOV, Orel State Agrarian University 

3 
 

FEATURES OF AN ECONOMIC APPROACH AT RESEARCH 
OF CORRUPTION PHENOMENON 
 
M.O. Izotov, Researcher 
.. , !"#$% 
 
Orel State Agrarian University, Orel City, Russia 
"&!%$  '!#"!('""$("!$(, '. ")&, !!$* 
Phone: +7 (920) 812-90-64, E-mail: max198522@mail.ru 
 
Received August 10, 2012 
 

ABSTRACT 

In article features of an economic approach are considered when developing the anti-corruption 
measures directed on restriction of possibilities of any discretion and excessive intervention of civil 
servants in economic activity, including through differentiation of functions and specification of competences. The special urgency of researches of a problem of corruption as special social phenomenon 
is noted. 
 
+ 

, , . !. 
 
KEY WORDS 

Corruption; Social and economic researches; Phenomenon; Model; Economic approach. 
 
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Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, No. 8 (8) / 2012 

6 
 

THE RATIONALE BEHIND WEAKLY TIED NETWORKING OF THE BANGLADESHI 
DIASPORA IN MALAYSIA 
 
Sultana Nayeem, Associate Professor 
 
Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh 
Phone: +880-1924752886, E-mail: sultana_nayeem@yahoo.ca 
 
Received August 7, 2012 
 

ABSTRACT 

This paper is an exploration of the survival strategies of the Bangladeshi Diaspora in Malaysia. To 
cope with the realities, Bangladeshi migrants develop different forms of survival strategies. As a result 
intra and inter-ethnic strong and weak ties are formed in the receiving country. Empirical analysis 
depicts that respondents with weak ties have higher income mobility than those with strong ties. It also 
demonstrates that the Bangladeshi migrants of the study areas do not restrict themselves only to their 
close social networks; rather they develop distant networks for higher social mobility. Or in other 
words, though the ideal socio-cultural model emphasizes community cohesion (something that can be 
conceptualized as an example of a tightly structured social system), the actual behavior of the Bangladeshi migrants indicates a loosely or disintegrated social system. Migrant’s embeddedness in the ongoing social relations and power structures regulates the nature and strength of these ties. 
 
KEY WORDS 

Mixed embeddedness; Bangla bazaar; Bangladeshi diaspora; Strong ties; Weak ties. 
 

Migration and settlement of Bangladeshis in 
Malaysia is a common fact during this period of 
globalization. The question is, therefore, not 
whether Bangladeshis migrate, instead, how they 
survive in a foreign country and develop different 
strategies to improve their fortunes. Bearing this 
question in mind an intensive ethno-survey was 
conducted both in Bangladesh (country of origin) 
and Malaysia (country of residence)1. These migrants are found as the heterogeneous groups of 
people, embedded in the diverse realities and liabilities of the origin and host societies2. 
Therefore, in this study, the readers may 
come across their non-homogeneous interests and 

 
1 Sultana, N. 2008. The Bangladeshi Diaspora in Malaysia. Organizational Structure, Survival Strategies and Networks, ZEF Development Studies. LIT: Berlin 
2 Research for this study was carried out through the financial assistance of DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service). Field research in Malaysia and Bangladesh was conducted among the immigrants and their families from June 2005 till August 2006. Field 
research data are derived from an interview-survey among 150 
current Bangladeshi migrants in Malaysia and intensive ethnographic fieldwork in Bangladesh and Malaysia. Along with 165 semistructured interviews (with returned and current migrants), some 
group discussions were arranged with returned migrants, their families, friends and neighbourhoods as well as with a N.G.O (established by well-off repatriated migrants). Sources of secondary data 
were literature reviews, newspaper articles, published and unpublished reports and conference papers. 

concomitant coping strategies. There (in the receiving society) networking is an asset. Our analysis has moreover evidenced that depending on 
their demands firstly of adaptation (to cope and 
survive in a foreign country) and secondly of 
upward mobility both strong and weak ties have 
been developed along the lines of horizontal and 
vertical networking. These networking are formulated (by the migrants) on the basis of the diverse everyday realities they face through their 
“mixed embeddedness”3. Regarding this, both the 
socio-economic, political and institutional structures of the origin and receiving countries as well 
as migrants’ socio-economic statuses, transnational contacts and duties are found as the regulators. Thus, along with bonds of strong and weak 
ties different types of alliances and cleavages are 
developed by the well-off and poor migrants in 
the horizontal level. Consequently, instead of 
homogeneity, heterogeneity and diversity are the 
common criteria for the Bangladeshi Diaspora in 
Malaysia. 
However, apart from these primordial types 
of networking, a kind of inter-ethnic strong (in
 
3 Robert Kloosterman, Joanne van der Leun and Jan Rath. 1999. 
Mixed Embeddedness: (In) formal Economic Activities and Immigrant Businesses in the Netherlands, p. 2. 

SULTANA NAYEEM, University of Dhaka 

7 
 

ter-ethnic friendship, marital and other kinds of 
intimate relationships) and weak ties (commercial 
networking like partnership in business etc.) were 
also found as the outcome of the migrants’ embeddedness in the receiving society, with which 
after all they had to cope with. 
The question is which of these characteristics are prominent, how do they contribute to the 
organizational structure of the community and in 
what context does that happen? Therefore, in the 
next sections at first we will define how strong 
and weak ties are operationalized. Later on, Granovetter’s (1973, 1983, and 1985) conception of 
“strong” and “weak ties” and the concomitant 
strength of weak ties (posited by him) will be 
analyzed testing against the data of this study4. 
This type of comparison is important on the 
ground that the formulation of different forms of 
networking, like friendship (for adaptation) or 
distant relationships (for survival in the host society), were defined by the migrants as a must 
that may bear a resemblance to his (Granovetter) 
point of view. This study will continue discussion 
highlighting the following aspects: methodology; 
operational definitions of strong and weak ties; 
revisiting Granovetter’s conception on strong and 
weak ties. 
Methodology. A brief overview of the 
sources of data and the methods that were applied 
to collect data is important to support the arguments of this study. Field research in Malaysia 
and Bangladesh was conducted among the immigrants and their families from June 2005 till August 2006. Field research data are derived from 
an interview-survey among 150 current Bangladeshi migrants in Peninsular Malaysia and intensive ethnographic fieldwork (with returned and 
current migrants) in Bangladesh and Peninsular 
Malaysia. 
Applying snowball sampling (something 
usually applied to find hidden population) Bangladeshi respondents were selected. In fact, neither the immigration department of the host country nor the emigration authorities of the home 
country had any concrete information about Bangladeshi migrants. Likewise, the central statistics 
bureau, the local police as well as the Bangladesh 

 
4 Mark S. Granovetter. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. AJS volume 78, Number 6 and Mark S. Granovetter. 1983. The Strength of 
Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. Sociological Theory, 
volume 1. See also Mark Granovetter. 1985. The University of 
Chicago. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. AJS Volume 91 Number 3, p. 481-510. 

High Commission in Malaysia failed to provide 
any data about the “hotspots” of Bangladeshi migrants or their statistical figure in Malaysia. On 
the contrary, each of them spoke of the migrants’ 
essentially mobile character. They also emphasized that Bangladeshi migrants used to stay and 
work there as undocumented workers and even, 
some of them could be found as husbands of Malaysians. Consequently, some open-ended questions were added in the survey questionnaires that 
provided information about the nature of their 
integration, embeddedness in local society and 
coping strategies.  
Besides, utilizing the networks of the respondents selected for interview-survey, interviewees were selected for more intensive interviews. 
These in-depth interviews were conducted to see 
whether or not the best solution was taken by 
Bangladeshi migrants to deal with their multidimensional embeddedness. Data, collected in 
that way, revealed that social networks, developed along the lines of horizontal and vertical 
networking, supported the migrants bearing their 
socio-cultural and psychological responsibilities 
in the transnational hubs. The said networks, 
moreover, decreased their costs of migration. 
Operational definitions of strong and 
weak ties. Trust is a common factor in close social networks. Unless an extreme situation 
(struggle for a scarce resource, e.g. an opportunity of migration to a foreign country) arrives, respective fellow feelings, duties and moral obligations remain intact within these strong ties that 
may echo the examples of the Chinese Gunaxi 
model as portrayed in Hammond’s work5. Referring to the work of Gao and Ting Toomey (1998) 
he has argued that the unconditional sharing of 
information (even secret) within the insider networks, is the main function of the Gunaxi relationship. In these relationships members are considered highly trustworthy and they are obliged to 
maintain that honor. According to him, within the 
insider networks relationships are perceived as 
family or like a family that cannot be altered except under extreme conditions. However, it is 
now known to us from the previous section’s discussion that with the exception of friends (that 
means fictive ties) most of the actors of strong 
ties always remain intimate since they possess 
common goals as each other’s consanguine and 
affine. 

 
5 Scott et al. (2004) 

Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, No. 8 (8) / 2012 

8 
 

For weak ties, the opposite situation is supposed to be normal, since this relationship is developed to mitigate different kinds of supply and 
demand. Since their (migrants’) close networks 
fail to fulfill their necessities (because of limited 
capabilities), they develop weak ties. For example, managing a way of migration or finding alternative sources of income etc. are fulfilled by 
developing weak ties. The actors of weak ties are 
not closely related to each other and hence do not 
meet frequently. In the same way, these people 
are not morally bound to assist each other, unless 
their service is purchased by the clients. Though 
the relationship is also developed instrumentalizing national brotherhood, but it mainly works 
depending on commercial exchange, instead of 
relying only on moral obligations (that can be 
seen in strong ties).  
Due to mutual demand for upward mobility 
well-off brokers support their clients (after extracting service charges from them) as parts of 
their manpower business; while on the other 
hand, in order to find ways of migration or higher 
income mobility, poor migrants develop relationships with them. Better-off businessmen cum 
brokers depend on poor migrants to make a profit 
via manpower and “hundy” business. They (the 
poor migrants) are also the buyers of Bangladeshi 
goods and food stuffs from these entrepreneurs’ 
enterprises, which operate in the study areas. 
Hence the actors of weak ties know that these ties 
are secondary (derivative/unoriginal) in nature 
and are essentially a tool for upward mobility. 
Accordingly it delineates that within the weak 
ties - all the actors cannot belong to the same so
cio-economic position and are not the possessors 
of equal capabilities (as well). 
As a matter of fact, if they all held equal 
power, information and capabilities to command 
any act, then none of them would waste money 
and time on these then essentially useless their 
weak ties. Rather, as a rational human being, they 
would find their own way depending solely on 
their strong ties. As an opposite form of relationship the strong ties on the other hand, are informal and primary (fundamental/original) in nature. 
They become parts of their close social networks 
naturally, owing to their embeddedness in kinship (blood related and marital kin) and friendship circles. So, these are the strong and weak tie 
situations in the study areas of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, to make clear how strong and 
weak ties are operationalized in this research, 
discussion on the following variables are incorporated to extract ideas about the roles and modes of networking as a potential survival strategy. 
The variables and values are: 
Frequency - the following questions were 
asked to find out how often actors of a network 
meet or get chances for interpersonal interaction: 
With whom are you living here? With whom 
are you working here? Do you have any fixed 
place or area for community get together? Where 
is this meeting place? When do you usually meet? 
How do you pass your leisure time? Normally 
where do you meet your inter-ethnic friends? 
Concerning these queries the following table 
is constructed: 

 
Table 1 – Frequency of Networks 
 

Housemate 
Co-workers 

Fixed 
place for 
community 
get together 

Passing 
leisure time 

Get together 
with inter-ethnic 
friends 

Ethnic (61.3%) 

Alone (6.7%) 

Ethnic 
and inter-ethnic 
(32%) 

Ethnic 
And inter-ethnic 
(94.6%) 

Not fixed 
(5.3%) 

Yes 
(97.3%) 

No 
(2.7%) 

Within 
Neighbor-hood 
Outside 
1-Housemates 
(18%) 
2-Workmates 
(48.7%) 
3-Mosjid and 
restaurant 
(15.3%) 
4-Neighbour 
(18%) 

1-Enjoying 
movies at 
home (9.3%) 
 
2-Gossiping in 
local restaurant 
(12%) 
 
3-Visiting local 
friends (10%) 

1-Visiting Kotaraya 
(23.3%) 
 
2-Going to pub 12.7%) 
 
3-Attending religious, 
political meetings and 
community get together 
(32.6%) 

Source: Survey data in Peninsular Malaysia. 

SULTANA NAYEEM, University of Dhaka 

9 
 

Table 1 denotes that apart from maintaining 
networks with their housemates, workmates and 
neighbors, Bangladeshis also attend different political and religious meetings and cultural celebrations. There are certain places for this kind of 
celebration which the migrants (both poor and 
better-off) try to visit. It is found that the betteroff migrants become the conveners of these cultural and politico-religious programs, where poor 
migrants participate in their free times. They visit 
Kotaraya (‘Bangla Bazaar’) to buy Bangladeshi 
goods from ethnic enterprises as well as to meet 
powerful labor brokers.  
The data also indicates that the migrants’ 
common living and working environment provides them the opportunity for regular contact 
with their ethnic and inter-ethnic friends. The 
common living and working niche as well as everyday interactions enable them to develop friendships with each other. In fact, along with the 
common experiences of immigration and everyday contacts, they (the Bangladeshis) face more 
or less the same realities as neighbors and workmates. Besides, they are found to spend their leisure hours together in their common surroundings (apart from visiting distant places and weak 
tie based networks). However, while the locals do 
not need to face an alien way of life (since they 
are all insiders there), owing to regular correspondence either in local restaurants or at their 
home and work places both of these groups still 
get the chance to construct networks. Bangladeshis meet the locals of Muslim belief in local 
mosque and “suraus”. Because of the same religious background (Islam) most of the Bangladeshi migrants and their (Malay, Indian Muslim and 
Indonesians etc.) friends enjoy and practice more 
or less similar religious festivals and rituals.  
Strength and Intensity - To pull out information on the emotional intensity, reciprocal exchange and respective obligations to each others 
in the network some questions were asked, such 
as:  
Whom do you consider your friend? How do 
you define your friend? Why do you maintain 
networks? How do you manage jobs and work 
permits? How did you get your dwelling place? 
Who introduced you to your employer? Where do 
you go to acquire a better job and other facilities? Do you pay them? Why do you assist 
poor/undocumented workers? How did you migrate? How do you send remittance to home 
country? How did you learn Bahasa? How do 

you manage to cope here? Why are you living 
together with others? How did/will you manage 
to stay longer? Why do you maintain homeland 
contacts? Why did you prefer inter-ethnic marriage? How did you meet your inter-ethnic 
spouse? How did you manage your business visa? How did you get this property? How did you 
manage risks? 
As a matter of fact, friendship ties were 
found primarily within people of the same socioeconomic background. For example, un-skilled 
and semi-skilled workers identified other workers 
as their friends who often also were their housemates, neighbors and workmates. In the same 
way, no professional and businessman was found 
who considered a semi-skilled and un-skilled 
worker as his or her friend. It is not likely that all 
of the neighbors or co-workers converted each 
other’s friend. Nor was national brotherhood considered as the only factor for friendship. Rather, 
migrants emphasized those as their friends whom 
they could trust in need. According to Ranjan 
Mallik (he used to work in a furniture factory of 
Kajang),  
“My 
co-workers, 
likewise 
Bangladeshi 
workers in Kajangjaya, are my friends. We are 
not so well-off. We have to send money to our 
families. I also have some friends in my home 
town. They take care of my family. Sometimes I 
send gifts for them or try to make phone calls. 
But I don’t have any girlfriend. I also don’t like 
the rich and educated Bangladeshis. They behave 
like we are not their countrymen. I know they 
would not assist me in danger. I don’t know any 
female workers. It is better to avoid them, because they might create extra burdens and our 
families would not be happy about that.” 
It can be ascertained (from the above comment) that professionals and businessmen generally are not friends with poor income groups. At 
the same time, it also assists us to know what 
they (the poor migrants) expect from their 
friends. Provision of trust, certainty, regular correspondence and assistance are the qualities 
among others through which their friendship is 
defined. On the basis of these moral and reciprocal obligations (for each other) they maintain 
friendship even with their home-based residues. 
Transnational networking helps them by allowing 
them to maintain contact with their home based 
friends. They (the migrants) are also assured that 
their friends reciprocate their obligations to the 
migrants by taking care of their families. These 

Russian Journal of Agricultural and Socio-Economic Sciences, No. 8 (8) / 2012 

10 
 

types of reciprocal obligations may remind us of 
the Chinese style of reciprocity, which is, “favors 
are always remembered and returned, but not always quickly. People who don’t return favors are 
seen as poisoning the well”6. 
Migrants on the other hand, reciprocate their 
service through being related with them. Maintenance of correspondence sometimes by gift donations or by long distance phone calls (allowing 
migrants to keep themselves informed about recent events) eases the cross border friendships. 
Thus along with the consanguine and affine, 
friends (both home and abroad) become part of 
the close social networks of the migrants.  
All of the workers (100%) argued that they 
needed to buy these services (management of a 
new job, renewal of work permit, immigration to 
Malaysia, transfer of money back to home etc.) 
from their powerful patrons (e.g. brokers cum 
businessmen). They went on to say that these 
brokers tried to “cheat” workers if they noticed 
that their so-called clients failed to participate in 
their forgeries and other un-lawful activities. 
Poor migrants thus instead of feeling loyalty and 
gratefulness (what they feel for their strong tied 
networks) towards their distant vertical networks, 
preferred to consider them as a strategy for higher social mobility. Therefore, from the comparisons between horizontal (intimate networks) and 
vertical networking (distant networks) we may 
safely say that distant and close social networks 
fundamentally do not resemble each other. Strong 
ties and close social networks incorporate mutual 
feelings and emotions towards each other, whereas in weak ties the expectation of material gains 
(higher income mobility, finding ways of settlement etc.) was more vital than any other concerns. Considering weak ties as distant relationships, actors visit them only when they become 
unable to fulfill their demands. As a result, the 
relative frequency of interactions of weak ties is 
lesser than that of strong ties.  
Whilst poor migrants strive after vertical 
networking with their affluent country men, the 
well-off businessmen try to enrich themselves 
(buying houses, setting up business enterprises, 
managing permanent resident status, staying on 
spouse visa etc.) through inter-ethnic business 
and marital relationships as well as depending on 
intra-ethnic weak ties. They meet their interethnic spouses either as co-workers and neigh
 
6 Scott et al. (2004) 

bors (33.3%) or through inter-ethnic friends’ contacts (66.7%). Because of the embeddedness in 
the institutional structures of the host society, 
these well-off businessmen instrumentalize interethnic networking to by-pass the anti-integrating 
immigration policy. Therefore, these privileged 
Bangladeshis not only empower themselves 
through patron client relationships, but also 
through inter-ethnic business and marital relations.  
Learning from their predecessors, poor migrants also try to develop inter-ethnic strong ties 
as they can then settle down in Malaysia and gain 
different means for shadow economic activities. 
Consequently, though for intra-ethnic strong ties 
moral obligations are the major factor, for interethnic strong ties commercial necessity is also a 
significant factor (for Bangladeshi migrants). 
However, these are identified as strong ties (rather than weak ties) on the ground that the marital 
relationship opens a scope of options for integration into the host society. Regarding this, Bangladeshi husbands also do not need to pay their 
inter-ethnic spouses. Actors do not belong to separate households; rather they interact on a daily 
basis. Bangladeshi husbands and their interethnic wives have more or less common aims 
(the well-being of their offspring and household). 
Revisiting Granovetter’s Conceptions on 
Strong and Weak Ties7. In his two articles entitled ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ and ‘The 
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited’, Granovetter (1973, 1983) sets some arguments on the functions of interpersonal networks, 
such as: (1) if any information is passed through 
weak ties it will reach a larger number of people 
and also cross more social distance than if same 
is attempted by strong ties (restricted to a small 
group of friends), because weak ties bridge different groups of people from different levels, (2) 
a person who has few or no weak ties is less likely to manage a way for upward mobility. Individuals with numerous weak ties can overcome this 
constraint. Since strong ties possess the same 
type of information that he already has, (such as, 
information about appropriate jobs openings at 
the exact time etc.), he fails to achieve his goals 

 
7 See also Nayeem Sultana. 2010. The Solutions of the ‘Transmigrants’ Dilemma. The Bangladeshi Diaspora in Malaysia. Dhaka 
University Journal of Development Studies, 1(1): 181-192. Dhaka 
University Journal of Development Studies, 1(1): 181-192. Nayeem 
Sultana. 2010. Re-visiting the Strength of Weak Ties: Bangladeshi 
Migration to Malaysia. Journal of Diaspora Studies, 3(2): 115-142. 

SULTANA NAYEEM, University of Dhaka 

11 
 

unless he increases his stock of information 
through forming weak ties. 
The hypothesis of the following statistical 
analysis is migrants with weak ties have higher 
income mobility than others with strong ties. 
Some proxies are made to define weak and strong 
ties, e.g. respondents were asked how they passed 
their leisure time? Their answers are coded as:  
Weak tie: visiting ‘Bangla Bazaar’ of Kotaraya, going to pubs and shopping centres, attending religious and political discussion and community get togethers. 
Strong tie: watching movies using satellite 
(with the housemates), visiting local friends 
(neighbours) and gossiping in a restaurant (local).  
We have regressed their monthly wage with 
both quantitative regressors: job alteration, length 
of stay in years in Malaysia and qualitative or 
dummy regressor: weak or strong tie. ANCOVA 
(Analysis of Covariance) model is as follows: 
 

i
i
i
i
i
u
X
X
D
Y
+
+
+
+
=
3
4
2
3
2
2
1
β
β
β
β
,

where, 
iY = monthly wage of the ith migrant in 
RM, 
i
X 2 = job alteration of the ith migrant, 
i
X 3 = 
length of staying in years of the ith migrant, 
i
D2 = 
1, if the migrant has weak tie; 0, otherwise (if 
strong tie). With 
iu  = error term, 
1
β = constant, 

4
3
2
,
,
β
β
β
= coefficients of dummy, job alteration 
and length of staying respectively. The following 
regression results are obtained: 

i
i
i
i
X
X
D
Y
3
2
2
228
.
83
556
.
93
779
.
363
295
.7
+
+
+
−
=

∧

se = (250.001) (173.518) (74.742) (19.806) 

 
t = (-.029) (2.096) (1.252) (4.202) 

 
p-value= (.977) (0.038)* (.213) (0.000)* 

 
R2 = .171, n= 150

 
Where, se means standard error of the estimated coefficient, t is t-statistic, p-value is the 
probability value, * - indicating p-value is significant at 5% level of significance, R2 is multiple 
coefficient of determination, i.e. the 17% variation in wages are explained by the regressors and 
n is the sample size. 
From the above results, it can be concluded 
that the dummy variable and length of stay have 
statistically significant relationship with the 
wage. Duration of migrant life in the host country 
has the strong positive effect on wage. Keeping 

all other variables constant, the average monthly 
wages of migrants with weak ties are higher by 
about RM 363.78 than those with strong ties. Our 
data in this study is cross-sectional one where 
heteroscedasticity may involve frequently. So, we 
assume that 
iu  is normally distributed with mean 
zero and variance 
2

i
σ
, i.e. 
iu ~
)
,0
(
2
i
N
σ
. We test 

by graphical method and White’s general heteroscedasticity test (White, 1980) with the null 
hypothesis: H0: there is no heteroscedasticity in 
the error variance and found H0 may be rejected. 
 

 
 
Figure 1 – Plotting residual to check heteroscedasticy 
 

From the above figure, it is depicted that the 
residual term of the fitted regression showing 
heteroscedasticity for different values of the regressors. The variances of the error (according to 
the black line of zero value) are fluctuating for 
different values at different band width. 
 
Table 2 – White Heteroskedasticity Test Results 
 

F-statistic 
9.932964 Probability 
0.000000 

Obs*R-squared 38.46709 Probability 
0.000000 

 
So, this study performed the White heteroscedasticity-consistent variances and standard error test for the remedy of heteroscedasticity and 
to get robust standard errors. 
 
Table 3 – White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 

Variable 
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic 
Prob. 

CONST 
-7.295058 
 279.9356 -0.026060  0.9792 

Dummy 
 363.7786 
 130.4603  2.788424  0.0060 

Alteration of job 
 93.55614 
 82.85140  1.129204  0.2607 

Length of staying 
 83.22766 
 33.05351  2.517968  0.0129 

-2000

-1000

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

20
40
60
80
100
120
140

Residual
Actual
Fitted